Великая Испанская революция - [192]

Handling the assistance that depended on a complex foreign policy situation, Stalin did not discontinue the struggle in Spain and strengthening of the control over the political system of the Republic. As experience of people’s democracies showed, when establishing communist regimes Stalin acted step by step even in much more favorable conditions.

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In May 1937, the revolutionary government was replaced by the coalition having an interest in the decrease and then in the complete reduction of the current revolution. However, the communists which, though seemingly reasonable, were the strongest fraction of May regime and did not give up on an idea to transform Spain into the socialist country (in their understanding of a word). Negrin’s government started de-collectivization and simultaneously nationalization. It was not just deviation from the former revolutionary gains, but change of a vector of revolution from self-government to etatism, governmentalization. The regime which was formed in Spain in May 1937 constituted an early form of «people’s democracy» — the regimes widely spread in the East Europe after the Second World War. «People’s democracy» was the pro-soviet regime combining a liberal facade and authoritarian etatist content. The facade-core ratio of the regime depended on the foreign policy factors, and under the influence of the West the facade could overcome the core in certain conditions. The «People’s democracy» constituted not just displacement of allies by a communist «green cuckoo», but also the synthesis of two etatisms — communistic and social-liberal — on the pro-soviet platform.

The more decisive steps towards «People’s democracy» in Spain could be made after completion of the civil war provided that the international situation had changed. When the time was right, it would be possible to unite communists and supporters of the pro-soviet policy in the united party, and clean up the opposition.

Having missed an opportunity to gain a military victory over the frankists, the Republic had only one chance to survive — to stay the course till the beginning of the Second World War. Such chance appeared in September 1938 due to Sudetic crisis, it continued even in 1939 as the Republic had though small, but sufficient resource of resistance to stay the course for some months in the unpredictable situation of the pre-military Europe.

However, the leading political forces of the Republic including the Prime Minister Negrin came to the conclusion that the defeat was inevitable and began to search for ways to minimize the costs of such catastrophe. The communists involved in the global struggle against fascism were ready to hold the last-ditch defense. But they also had to operate in the wake of the policy of Negrin whose maneuvers caused mistrust in the increasing republican part, who were afraid to be left in the evacuation basket.

As a result, Casado rebellion commanded the widest political support including that from the opponents of unconditional surrender. The rebellion provoked a collapse of the Republic five months prior to the beginning of the Second World War.

Its collapse became one of the signals (even though far from the major) for Stalin to change the foreign policy strategy. The collapse of the Spanish Republic became the visible proof of People’s Front strategy and collective safety crash which Stalin accepted in 1934–1936 with so much pain.

In the end of the civil war Franco defined his position as neutrality to which he began to incline as early as in the troubled Munich days. At least in that way the Republic won — it bled frankism and didn’t allow it to involve Spain in the Second World War.

At the same time, the first battle against fascism took place in Spain, which would end up with crash of the fascist block in 1945.

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The shift to industrial democracy was stopped not as a result of internal processes, but as a result of the violent suppression of the revolution. The military defeat taken by itself didn’t yet give grounds for the conclusion about crucial non-viability of these or those models. History provides many examples of military destruction of social and political structures which in the context of other military-political conditions gave an example of high efficiency and viability. The issue of syndicalist alternative viability was reduced to a question as to whether such society could exist by maintaining its originality with regard to the «capitalist» and «state-communist» models.

There is a strong probability that in those years the ideals of self-government and consecutive democracy could fight their way to become a reality only under the extreme circumstances. It is difficult to say whether the anarchist self-government could survive in the conditions of a quiet life. Experience of many countries in the West and «socialist» Yugoslavia showed that self-government and federalism in the conditions of industrially-bureaucratic society had been implemented more in manner than in matter, but nevertheless improved the living conditions. Global historical tendencies proved to be stronger than the ideas which were generated ahead of time. But, only reaching out beyond the horizon, it will be possible to overcome a vicious circle of routine.