Философские идеи Людвига Витгенштейна - [61]

. Analytic devices concentrated around the idea of "family resemblances" are meant to overcome the illusion of literal correspondence of every notion to some unified entity (a set of features and so on). Using them reminds us every time that, to nearly every of the notions, a multifarious reality corresponds which includes a continuity of transitional stages and has no strict boundaries. Indeed, there are no pure biological, psychological or social types; as is known, in real objects, the corresponding features exist as mixed up, varied, intervowen. The analytic idea of "family resemblances", while undermining the oversimplification of notions, helps to correlate variable reality with its conceptual speech expressions in a more flexible and adequate manner.

4. Understanding the essence of the late Wittgenstein's analytic programmes and of his practical methods is hindered by the obtaining practice of reading his analytic considerations (excercises, illustrations and so on) in terns of usual theory. The result is viewing the "language-game" idea as a relativist, subjectivist theory of language, as the idea of "family resemblances" - so, it is treated as a theory of abstraction deserving severe criticism, as a frequently practiced analytical device of translating inner (mental, etc.) phenomena of psychology onto the plane of an external, available to the analysis, concrete action, i.e. as the behaviorist theory of consciousness This "shift in attitude" gives rise to various absurdities: the positions asccribed to the philosopher are those which he himself criticizes, etc. The correct reading of Wittgenstein's texts requires one to take into consideration the fact that the analytic ideas elaborated by him have practical-methodological - rather than theoretic - nature; so, they should be viewed as artificial procedures whose aim is create the habit of accuracy in correlating the verbal with the real. Meanwhile, both readers and investigators of Wittgenstein find it difficult to realize that the author of the analytic interpretation of philosophy could give up theoretical mode of thinking; that philosophy is, in his view, an activity (practice) - rather than a doctrine - aimed at clarifying the conceptual-speech forms through which the complicated, variable and dynamic reality is represented. Along with our critical, polemic attitude towards the analytic interpretation of nature and of the tasks of philosophy as to insufficient one, as to the one overlooking a whole complex of important problems[202] , we would like to stress the need for dialectical-materialist interpretation (and pracctical application) of the authentic content present in the logical-speech analysis which is the real achievement of the XXth century analytic thought.

A.F. Griaznov. The problem of "conceptual necessity" in L.Wittgenstein's works [203]

1. The idea of "conceptual necessity" was investigated in the socalled logic of "internal relations" of British Absolute Idealism. At the center of its metaphysics lied a justification of the necessary character of judgements with their specific conceptual unity (it was supposed that sich a unuty could not be created by lodical constants). Conceptual ties were interpreted as the products of symbolism itself and treated as entirely dependent on the related terms. Necessary and internally essentical character of conceptual ties was explained by an intermediary activity of the "Absolute". In the beginning of the 20th century Russell's logic of "external relations" and his "multiple" theory of judgement stood in opposition to the logic of Absolute Idealism; it rehabilitated independent character of relation is and pluralistic ontology. This theory explained our ability to understand judgement's sense by our direct "acquaintance" with all the constituents. Traditional subject-predicate analysis of judgement's structure was super-seded by "functional" analysis. Inspite of the fact that this early analytical logic of "external relations" was widely accepted for some period of time a restoration of the priority of "internal relations" and the idea of "conceptual necessity" took place in Anglo-American philosophy after that. And this in general was due to lodical and philosophical activity of L.Wittgenstein.

2. Wittgenstein worked out his original "picture" theory in polemic with Russellian views. Wittgensteinian theory was based on idea of conceptual unity and isomorfism of sentence's "logical form" and an elementary fact which is pictured by the sentence. His acknowledgement that the "world" consists of "facts" and not of "things" stresses purely internal relations of logical "objects". There is a close correspondence between these relations and the relations of senses of the sentences. Early Wittgenstein distinguished between "signs" (which have "material" qualities) and "symbols" (which are signs used according to the rules of "logical syntax" and which have sense). "Symbols" are conceptual by their very nature and that is why all logical relations in the